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R&D and the Productivity Slowdown
ABSTRACT
Can the recent productivity slowdown be explained by the slowdown
in the growth of R&D expenditures that has occurred since the mid 60's?
The earlier estimated rates of return to R&D together with the observed
magnitude of the decline in R&D cannot account for much of the productivity
decline. A new econometric study based on recently released BLS data for
39 2- and 3-digit manufacturing industries covering the 1959-1977 time
period is used,therefore, to investigate the relationship between produc-
tivity, physical capital, and different measures of cumulated past R&D ex-
penditures. It confirms the earlier conclusions and reveals an apparent
decline in the effectiveness of R&D expenditures in the latter half (1969-
1977) of this pe~iod.The interpretation of these results is clouded, however,
by problems with the data and doubts about the applicability of standard
modes of analysis to disequilibrlum ~ituations. Also, many of the effects of
the R&D slowdown may still be in the future, while many other important con-
tributions are not reflected at ~ll in the official productivity measures as
they are currently defined and constructed.
Zvi Griliches
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The question I shall address in this paper is "Can the slowdown
in productivity growth be explained, wholly or in part, by the recent
slowdown in the growth of real R&D expenditures?". But first we have to
review the following questions: (1) What is to be explained? Which pro-
ductivity and what slowdown? (2) What is the mechanism by which R&D
could have contributed to this slowdown? And, (3) What did happen to
R&D in the relevant period? Besides traversing this somewhat fami.1iar
ground and reviewing some of the recent literature on this topic, I shall
also report on some estimates of my own.
The direct answer to the opening question is "Probably not." But
how we get there needs documenting and may prove instructive on its own
merits.
I
There are several productivity "slovldowns"which may be candidates
*This research has been supported by NSF grants No. SOC78~04279 and PPA79-
13740. I am indebted to Alan Siu for very able research assistance and to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Economic Growth, for making its un-
published data series available to me. This paper- was presented at the
American Economic Association ~feetings, Atlanta, Ceorgia, December 28, 1979,
Session on Productivity.for an explanation.
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The literature defines two slowdowns in the growth of
labor productivity: 1965-73 and 1973-78. The first "slowdown" occurs almost entirely'
outside of manufacturing. The second is pervasive and steep but seems to be
associated with the aftermath of the energy crisis which began in 1974 ,and
the deep recession of 1974-75. If one looks at total factor productivity (as
,
estimated by Frank Go1lop and Dale Jorgenson or John Kendrick) the picture
is murkier. In Go110p and Jorgenson there is no evidence that total factor
productivity grew more slowly in manufacturing in 1966~73 than earlier (1960-
66). Among the 20 2-digit industries reported by them 11 had higher (or equal
rates of growth in the later period and 9 had lower ones. Kendrick estimates
that the rate of growth of total factor productivity in manufacturing in 1966-
73 was below that in 1957-66 but comparable to the average rate of growth
- ...
between 1948 and 1957 (2.1, 3.0 and 2.0 respectively). Looking at 95 BLS
growth sectors in manufacturing (most of.which are at the 3-digit SIC level)
which are thenulllbers I have been analyzing recently, one cannot discern a
clear slowdown in labor productivity before the mid-70's.
In what follows I shall concentrate primarily on manufacturing because
this is where one would expect to be able to observe the effects of R&D on
productivity best. In most other areas, such as services or government, out-
put is not measured distinctly enough from input to be worth analyzing in any
detail. The only other major sectors where measured productivity could be
affected by R&D expenditures in the longer run are agriculture, communications,
transportation and public utilities. There hasbeenho r~cent productivity decline
to speak of in the firstth~ee,'while the decline in the utilities sector is
1 largely. due to :the energy crisis induced reduction in capacity utilization.-3-
II
R&D is an investment flow. What affects output is presumably some
cumulated stock of the previous results of such investments. Since such
results are not easily measurable, most growth accountants have constructed
some stock of R&D capital measure: K = ~w R where the "stock" K is
t [. i t-i'
a function of past investments R, and the w's reflect the assumed lag and
depreciation schemes. Given such a measure, the contribution of K to out-
put growth is measured by yk, where y is the elasticity of aggregate
output with respect to R&D capital and k is its rate of growth. An alter-
native form is given by pNR/Q, where p is the gross rate of return to R&D
investments, NR is the net investment in research capital and Q is total
or sectoral output. Thus, we need at least three parameters, facts, or
assumptions before we can proceed to an estimate of the effects of -R&D on
growth: (1) an estimate of y or p j (2) a measurement of the relevant
rate of R&D expenditures; and (3) evidence or assumption about its lag struc-
2 ture and depreciation pattern.
The R&D to GNP ratio peaked at about 2.9% in 1964 and declined slowly
to about 2.3 in 1975. Not all of this R&D is contributing to productivity
growth as it is currently measured. Much of it is spent on defense and
space exploration, on health and environment, and on goods and services
(such as computers) where quality improvements brought about by such expendi-
tures are not cap.tured in our national accounts. Since much of the slowdown
in R&D occurred in these sectors, the slowdown in R&D that could have had a
measurable impact was not as large as the crude figures might indicate. I.'
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have previously estimated (1973) that only about half of total R&D as
measured is likely to affect measured productivity and that only about half
of the remainder represents net additions to the stock of research results.
If these ratios have remained constant, the "effective" R&D to GNP ratio
may have declined from about 0.72 to .57, or about .25 percentage points.
Even assuming a relatively high ra~e of return of 40 percent would
account at most for a .1 percent decline in the rate of growth.
But how about its timing? The fact that R&D investments in constant
dollars peaked in the mid-60's does not imply that the associated stock
measures peaked at the same time. Figure 1 plots the rates of growth of
output per manhour in manufacturing (adjusted for interindustry shifts) and
the rates of growth in two measures of the stock of applied research and
'development capital. The first R&D capital measure is based on a no deprecia-
tion assumption while the second assumes a 20 percent per,annum decline in the
effectiveness of past R&D investments. Since the vertical scale is logarith-
mic, the slope of the curves is equal to the relevant rates of growth.
Looking at this plot, it is hard to discern a clear decline in the
growth rate of labor productivity in manufacturing, though it has been
hitting new lows in the 70's. There is, however, a clear decline in the
rate of growth of R&D capital, of about 3 to 6 percentage points, depending
on the exact comparison period and the particular series chosen for the com-
parison. The same numbers, averaged for the 1960-65, 1965-73, and 1973-77
periods, are summarized in Table 1.
III
To assess the impact of such a substantial decline in the rate of-5-
growth of R&D capital on productivity growth we need an estimate of the
elasticity of aggregate or sectoral output with respect to changes in the
/
R&D capital. In previous work (1979) using 1957-65 data on 883 large U.S.
eorporations, I estimated this elasticity to be about .06 (corresponding
to a no depreciation concept of R&D capital). This estimate together with
a lowering of the R&D capital rate of growth by about 2.3 percent (see Table
1) imply a contribution of about .14 percent to the productivity slowdown in
'manufacturing, accounting for about one-tenth of it.
This could be an underestimate for two reasons: (a) my earlier esti-
mates are based on firm data and hence do not capture social returns and
the spillover effects of R&D, and, (b) they are based on an earlier period,
when everything was growing together. In the more recent period there has
been more variance in the R&D variable and perhaps one could get better and
also possibly higher estimates if the analysis were extended to the 70's.
I turn, therefore, to an analysis of R&D and productivity at an
approximately 3-digit SIC level, using the newly released BLS growth sector
output, manhours, and capital stock data (see BLS Bulletins 2018 and 2034),
and the NSF data on Applied Research and Development expenditures by product
fields. The 95 BLS sectors were aggregated into 39 sectors and the 29 NSF
product fields were disaggregated to match. The R&D series were deflated and
3 cumulated using a declining balance depreciation scheme. A capital service
flow measure was defined as Depreciation in constant dollars plus .08x Net
Stock of Fixed Capital. The BLS numbers are for gross output, not value
added, but I shall proceed on the assumption that the two moved proportionately'
for most of the period in question. Both the numbers and the measures con-
structed from them are rather crude. The purpose, however, was not to do a-6-
detailed industry level total factor productivity analysis but rather to
see whether there is some prima facie evidence for R&D being the major cul-
prit in the recent slowdown.
The basic approach is to allow for industrial differences in both the
average level of productivity and in the capital elasticity. This is accom-
plished by estimating everything "within" industries, i.e., after subtracting
the mea~ levels of each variable within each industry"and by multiplying the
capital variable in each industry by its estimated share in value added.
Table 2 presents the major results of this analysis using the no depreciation
version of R&D capital.~ If one starts with a definition of total factor
productivity and allows only R&D to affect it (besides time dummies), the
estimated coefficients are high and very significant. If one adds, however,
other variables to the equation," such as the average age of capital and total
manhours (raflecting the short run phenomenon of increasing returns to scale
during the business cycle), the R&D coefficierus decline and so does also
their statistical significance. If we do not impose the TFP framework and
allow the capital variable to have its own coefficient, the results are better
both in terms of fit and in the significance of the R&D variables, though the
capital variable gets a coefficient of less than half it~ expected size. ~~en
the period is broken into two, 1959-68 and 1969-77, the results for the first
period are strengthened, with the estimated coefficient being about the same
.(.07) as I had found earlier at the micro level, but there is nothing to be
found in the second period. The contribution of R&D goes to zero or at least
cannot be discerned in these data and in this period.
In part this could be a data problem: price indexes get differentially
bad as inflation be'3i'l\S' to accelerate, the proportionality between gross output-7-
and value added begins to break down in this period, and there are rather
large swings in capacity utilization unaccounted for by our theories and by
the measures used here. I have a sneaking suspicion, however, that the effect
may be real. First, various attempts to improve upon these results by allow-
ing for differential materials and energy intensity of the different industries,
adding capacity utilization measures in the 1967~77 period, and by throwing out
industries whose price deflators are of dubious quality led to no appreciable
improvement. Second, the lack of published results of the contribution of R&D
to productivity bas~on post 1968 data leads me to suspect that this is not an
isolated finding or peculiar to the specific data set used here. I know of
only three studies whose results are based on data which go past 1968: M.I.
Nadiri, R. Brinner, and E.C. Agnew and D.E. Wise. All three studies include
parts of the later period in their total sample but only Nadiri examines it
separately. He has, however, to resort to ridge regression techniques to
get s~nsible looking results and does not include a separate trend variable,
attributing all of TFP growth to R&D. Brinner's estimates are based on total
domestic GNP, including many sectors where productivity is either not measured
at all (such as residential capital formati.on) or measured very badly (such as
services). His estimates are of similar order of magnitude (.06) but are not
very robust to the inclusion of other variables (they fall to .03 when labor
is adjusted for quality change). The Agnew-Wise study fits TFP estimates for
11 2-digit U.S. manufacturing industries for the period 1957-75 to various
R&D measures and R&D spillover measures and gets essentially nothing. I also
have seen a number of unpublished papers where passing remarks are made which
imply that the authors tried to extend their study to the more recent period
but with little or no success.-8';'
If these f{ndings are to be taken at their face value, they imply a
larger effect of R&D on the slowdown with the effect coming not so much from
the slowdown in R&D as from the collapse in the productivity. of R&D. If one
assumes that previously R&D capital was growing at a rate of 6 percent per
year and the associated R&D output elasticity was .07, then its contribution
to the rate of growth of productivity in manufacturing was .42 percent per
year in the earlier period. The total disappearance of this contribution
could account for more than a quarter of the recent productivity slowdown.
How can one explain this collapse of the R&D coefficient in the 70's?
It is possible that a large fraction of recent R&D investments has been diverted
to finding ways of complying with various new environmental and other regulatory
constraints. But that should not have happened across the board. Notall indus-
tries have been subject to the same regulatory pressures. Nor should it depre-
ciate all of the "older" R&D investments down to zero. It is also possible that
much of the effect of past R&D is embodied in new equipment and a slowdown in
capital growth may induce also a decline (a postponement) in the effect of R&D
on productivity. This may be testable and would imply that a pick-up in invest-
ment would also induce a recovery in the R&D coefficient. The most likely
explanation is one of confusion: the large energy price shocks, the resulting
fluctuations in capacity utilization, the substantial increase in uncertainty
about future absolute and relative prices may have forcromany firms away from
their long-run production frontiers. What we see in the data are not movements
along the technological frontier and hence they should not and cannot be
attributed to a variable whose role is to shift this frontier outward.The other point to remember as space constraints close in on us, is
that even though the measured effects of R&D on measured productivity may
be small, its true effects may be quite a bit larger. First, we have yet to
·5
learn how to measure the spillover effects of R&D within and across industries.
Second, much of past and current R&D is spent on socially valuable activities
such as our health and the health of our environment, items that are not
valued positively in the national accounts as currentlyconstitute1. Finally,
R&D is a chancy and fickle process. Even i~ it has run intO a dry spell, this
does not imply that current expenditures may not have future returns or that
there are no major productivity gains already on the drawing boards. All sub-
stantive surveys of new technologies and new technological possibilities seem
to contradict the notion that we have exhausted our innovation possibilities.
Thus I interpret my lack.of findings as reflecting data difficulties and the
turmoil of the times rather than a trlle underlying trend shift. In any case,
it is unlikely that the recent productivity slowdown can be blamed primarily
on the R&D slowdown. If anything, causality may run in the other direction.-10-
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Footnotes
1. Because of space limitation I am not documenting the various statements
. made in the text. They are consistent with the facts as reported by Denison,
Gollop and Jorgenson, Kendric~ and Norsworthy et al.
2. See Griliches (1979b) for a more detailed exposition. See also Griliches
(1973), Mansfield and Terleckyj for earlier npplications of this kind of
framework.
3. The AR&D data by product field were used rather than the R&D industry
figures because (a) they are more compatible with the establishment based
productivity series and (b) they provide somewhat more industrial detail.
Basic research is not broken down by product field and hence is not included
in these stock measures. Since it accounts for only 3 percent of total R&D
in industry, its inclusion would not affect the overall picture. Note that
one could quarrel with a measure of social R&D capital that may decline just
due to the passage of time. But to open this issue here would take us too
far afield.
4. Experiments with (geometric) depreciation rates of 10, 20 and 30 percent
per year led largely to the same results. The data can hardly distinguish
I
between them, showing a slight preference for 0 or 10 percent. The only
noticable difference in the results are negativ~ though insignifican~R&D
coefficients for the 1964-77 period when higher depreciation rates are used.
s. See Griliches (1979b) for more discussion, also Agnew-Wise (1979) and
Schankerman (1979) for examples of such attempts. (There has been no convincing
ahowing of spillover effects using post-1968 data.) .-13-




Output per Man hour <5 = 0 <5 = .1 <5 = .2
1960-65 3.4 10.3 8.5 7.0
1965-73 2.8 7.9 6.4 5.6












Table' 2-: R&D Stock' Coefficients in Various Spe'e:l:fications: Within 39
u.S. Man~facturingSectors, N = 741.
Period and Dependent
Variable




1. TFP, 1959-77 .058 .124 None
(.030)
2. TFP, 1959-77 .029 .110 Age C, 'NlIRS
(.027)
3. LPROD, 1959-77 .044 .106 (l-LS)·L(SFC/MHRS),
(.026) Age C, MHRS
4. LPROD, 1959-68 .067 .064 (l-LS)·L(SFC/~lliRS),
(.029) Age.Q, UHRS
5. LPROD, 1969-77 .026 .078 (l-LS)·L(SFC/MlIRS),
(.046) Age C, MHRS
TFP = LPROD-(l-LS) [LSFC-~mRS]
LPROD = Log output per manhour
'(l-LS)[L(SFC{MHRS)] = (I-Average 71-75 labor share in value added) (Log service
flow measure of fixed capital minus log total manhours)
R&D Stock: log (cumulated sum of deflated applied research and development ex-
penditures from 1959 on plus 1958 initial value). 1958 initial value =
R58!g, where g is the estimated rate of growth of R in a particular indus-
try during 1959-64.
S.E.E. - standard deviation of residuals.
All equations contain an intercept and year dummies. "Within" means that all
variables are measured around their respective industry means.Fig. 1 Growth rates (lnyt-lnyt_1), in percent
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